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1. In tro d u c tio n
The prolonged debt crisis of the 1980s has given rise to recent 
theoretical debates on the fundam entals of in ternational debt. 
As is to be expected, each of the different schools of economic 
thought adheres to its basic premises, and the resulting  th e ra ­
pies vary accordingly. However, there are some converging 
views as well. This chapter will briefly describe where opinions 
agree and differ. Hopefully this sum m ary will also shed some 
light on the past, even though the discussions of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries are not dealt with. Since most of the au ­
thors in th is volume are distinguished historians but not neces­
sarily professional economists, an effort will be made to keep 
the economists' often barely understandable jargon -  for which 
the Brazilians invented the poignant term  economês - ,  to a m in­
imum. On the other hand, a ra th e r broad range of bibliography 
is referred to and quoted so th a t readers w ith a particular in te­
rest in the pertinent theoretical discussions can find the neces­
sary m aterial. The paper will not go beyond economics into the 
much broader field of "development studies," firstly because 
there is enough food for thought in the field of economic theory, 
"debt" being undoubtedly a genuinely economic subject, and sec­
ondly because topics such as economy-ecology, -culture, -demo­
cracy, -happiness, -values, etc. would each w arran t an essay of 
its own.
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I t would seem particularly  appropriate to s ta r t the survey of 
contemporary theories on debt a t a conference of historians 
w ith a reference to the work of Charles Kindleberger, one of 
the world's leading scholars of economic history, followed by a 
brief sum m ary of M arxist approaches to the problem. The ru l­
ing orthodoxy, i.e., the World Bank's "debt cycle" theory, will 
then be discussed. In  the ir tu rn  Latin Americans have devel­
oped a body of heterodox "structuralist" theorem s which coun­
te r and absorb large parts of the "Northern" doctrines and which 
are indispensable to an understanding of w hat the world looks 
like from the debtors' perspective. Finally, the "Monetary 
Keynesians" are introduced. These are particularly  strong a t 
the D epartm ent of Economics and Business A dm inistration of 
the Free U niversity of Berlin where they form a very active 
"Berlin School," and w ith whom our small group of economists 
a t the interdisciplinary Institu te  of Latin American Studies 
have close contacts and largely identify with.
The debt crisis has not only revived the fundam ental macro- 
economic and political economy approaches to development and 
underdevelopm ent a t the periphery of the world system, but it 
has also enhanced the microeconomic discussion on "institu­
tions" dealing w ith the crisis. Both politically and pragm atically 
the in terests of the individual actors are analyzed w ith regard 
to institu tional change, gaps, hypertrophies, and dynamics in 
search of accommodating m utual in terests ra th e r than  imple­
m enting specific development strategies based upon certain 
macroeconomic doctrines. This article thus ends w ith a short 
resumé, in the light of micro- or institu tional economic theory, 
of some of the suggestions brought up by economists to improve 
the present debt crisis m anagem ent or even to "solve" the crisis.
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2. K in d leb erg er 's  In d u c tiv e  M odel o f  F in a n c ia l C rises
In his pioneering study of financial crises from 1720 to 1970 
and his subsequent work on the crash or near-crash of October 
19, 1987, Charles Kindleberger (1978, 1988, 1989) developed a 
model which he him self sum m arizes as follows (Kindleberger 
1989: 172-173):
One s ta rts  from an autonomous shock to the system th a t alters 
profit opportunities,...it may be the outbreak of w ar or the arrival 
of peace, a good harvest, a bad harvest, a pervasive innovation 
such as the railroad or automobile, a discovery, an oil shock like 
those of 1973 and 1979. The displacem ent can be financial, ra th e r 
th an  real.... W hatever the shock, a reordering of investm ent prior­
ities is called for, an investm ent boom is started , and it may -  I 
avoid saying it m ust -  go too far. The boom may subside by it­
self.... Often, however, destabilizing speculation sets in...there 
may be a panic...to hold the panic...[t]here should be a lender of 
last resort, who m akes money freely available against sound as­
sets.
When applying this pattern  to the debt crisis of the 1980s, 
Kindleberger is prim arily concerned about the U.S.A.'s inabili­
ty and unwillingness to act as "world stabiliser" (Kindleberger 
1989: 312) and about the absence of a lender of last resort. He 
is sceptical w ith regard to "shared responsibility" and doubts 
the ability of the IMF to act as quickly as required in moments 
of panic. His reference to "Basle," i.e., the Bank for In ternation­
al Settlem ents (BIS) as the bank of the world's central banks 
shows, however, th a t he acknowledges the im portant role of 
this ra th e r discreet institu tion which during the 1982 Mexico 
crisis was the fast-moving "fire brigade" bringing together the 
necessary "bridging loans" from its member central banks at 
very short notice (Nitsch 1987, 1989a), i.e., acting as some kind 
of collective lender of last resort.
Kindleberger's analysis is akin to conventional business cy­
cle theories where "growth" and "development" play a second­
ary role, and his inductive method leaves theorists of the var­
ious denom inations somewhat dissatisfied. It is therefore in­
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teresting to examine w hat theoretical economists consider to 
constitute the inner logic of the phenom ena which Kindleber- 
ger so aptly describes and sum m arizes in an inductive manner.
3. M arx ist A p p ro a ch es  to  E x te r n a l D eb t a n d  th e  P r e se n t  
D eb t C risis
In the tradition  of Hilferding (1910) and Lenin (1960 [1916]) 
M arxists have always stressed the exploitative and crisis-, if not 
war-prone character of finance capital exports and the ir logical 
counterpart, debt, on the basis of overaccumulation and under­
consumption in the m etropolitan countries (for Latin  America 
see M arichal 1980 and 1989). The capitalist world system  is 
seen as a hierarchy w ith "hegemonic cycles." In accordance w ith 
Schubert (1985), A ltvater and H übner (1987, 1989) depict the 
present debt crisis, in a m anner highly compatible w ith Kindle- 
berger's view, as an outcome of the U.S. hegemonic crisis:
The in ternal causes of national debt crises may very well vary 
from country to country, but the in ternational debt crisis is a di­
rect product of the transform ation of the U.S. American hegemon­
ic system (Altvater and H übner 1989: 61; all transla tions from 
Germ an and Spanish texts by MN).
The m ain economic indicator of the crisis is the in terest ra te  
which is kept high not only to a ttrac t foreign capital to the 
U.S.A. w ith both its budget and balance of paym ents deficits, 
but also because of the rising risk  prem ium  in a "monetary 
nonsystem" (John Williamson) approaching the characteristics 
of gambling in "Casino Capitalism" (Susan Strange). Their sug­
gested way out which in 1987 still consisted of a "new in te rn a­
tional economic order" (Altvater and H übner 1987: 28; quoting 
Fidel Castro, i.e., h in ting a t a socialist alternative) turned 
more modest two years la ter (Altvater and Hübner: 1989: 67- 
68), w hen only stric ter political intervention and in ternational 
regulation were advocated. Most recently A ltvater (1991) has 
elaborated on the principles which were to guide such global
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regulation, nam ely democratic participation, public discourse 
and control as well as ecological considerations.
For the developing debtor countries, a "net resource transfer" 
towards the North, i.e., a surplus of exports over im ports by 
which the debtors service their obligations, is a highly scan­
dalous phenomenon indicating a drain from the "open veins of 
Latin America" (Eduardo Galeano) ra th e r than  a reasonable 
cure by "growing out of debt" as the IMF tries to suggest (Alt- 
vater and H übner 1987: 22). Franz H inkelam m ert (1988) from 
Costa Rica sharply criticizes the recent export surplus of Latin 
America, comparing the resulting international transfer to the 
M arshall P lan -  only th a t it works the other way round, i.e., 
from the debtor to the creditor.
The paym ent of in terest on a loan is, of course, always a "net 
resource transfer," even a t clearly nonusurious rates, and the 
accounting balance between imports and exports of a country 
can hardly be taken by itself as a reliable macroeconomic indi­
cator of a "drain" (see the devastating criticism of the "myth of 
the resource transfer" by Riese [1986: 170-175]). Otherwise, in­
dustria l countries w ith chronic export surpluses such as Japan  
and Germ any would also have to be categorized as drained and 
exploited. However, there is more than  a grain of tru th  in the 
argum ent, once it is placed against the background of the tra u ­
matic, sudden compression of imports after 1982, the serious 
fiscal problems, the curtailm ent of investm ents, and the con­
com itant inflationary processes which w ent hand in hand with 
the export surplus of the 1980s. T hat is why Hinkelam m ert, 
who is not very convincing when he deduces the debt peonage 
of the Latin  American countries from their recent export su r­
plus, gains credibility when he refers to the sheer impossibility 
of servicing the debt in the face of high in terest ra tes (due to the 
U.S. policies already referred to), to rising protectionism (partic­
ularly w ith regard to the first stages of raw  m aterials m anufac­
turing and other "sensitive" products) and to persistent export- 
promoting policies by Japan , Germany and some of the East 
Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). Therefore he is 
really arguing th a t the problem lies not so much w ith the net
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transfer per se, bu t in the present environm ent which so d ras­
tically lim its exportation th a t a net repaym ent of the debt be­
comes impossible. In H inkelam m ert's own words (1988: 79-80):
T hat debts are unpayable is not a catastrophe for the creditor, — 
on the contrary. He who can service his debts, repays them  and 
rem ains a free man. However, he who has unpayable debts, loses 
his freedom.... He falls into slavery: The unpayable debts have 
tu rned  Latin America into a Sisyphus who never arrives where 
he w ants to go and who never is allowed to rest.... T hat is why 
the declaration of the debts to be unpayable was a declaration of 
definitive victory for the in ternational banks and the countries of 
the center, whereas it was a declaration of long-term defeat for 
Latin America.
4. T h e O rth od ox  V iew
In contrast to the global political economy inherent in both Kind- 
leberger's and the M arxists' approach, the orthodox view, as 
epitomized by the World Bank's World Development Report 
1985, takes the nation-state as its sole political framework and 
limits itse lf to ra th e r mechanical economics. The leading tex t­
book of development economics, Gerald Meier's (1989: 246-247) 
Leading Issues in Economic Development gives the following ex­
planation to the reproduction of the World Bank's graph (see 
Figure 1):
A borrowing country proceeds through a sequence of growth-cum- 
debt phases.... [W]hen investm ent and government expenditures 
exceed savings and taxes, there is a real resource gap, which is 
filled by an excess of imports over exports in the current account.
The external debt th a t finances the excess imports is the finan­
cial counterpart to the real resource transfer. A developing coun­
try  will therefore proceed through stages in which the resource 
gap, then  the debt, and finally the income level rise. In the la ter 
phase, the resource gap declines first, followed by the debt, while 
the income level continues to rise.... Once savings become greater 
than  domestic investm ent plus the in terest paym ents, the re­
source surplus can be utilized for amortization, and the debt will 
fall...until the indebtedness is repaid.
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Figure 1: Balance of Payments Flows and Debt Stock During the Debt Cycle 
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The historical examples on which the debt-cycle hypothesis 
draws (Siebert 1989) are the U.S.A. between the Civil W ar and 
the end of World W ar I or II as well as post-war Germany, J a ­
pan and -  more recently -  South Korea. Since th is view has 
been, and still is, highly influential as the implicit theory be­
hind public opinion and policies as well as the explicit tool of 
formal modelling in planning m inistries and financing agen­
cies, it calls for a somewhat more detailed evaluation.
The political economy points of criticism have already been 
mentioned -  th a t boom and slump have been global ra th e r than  
national phenom ena over more than  the last two hundred years 
and th a t hegemonic cycles in hierarchical structures ra ther 
than  symmetrical relationships between sovereign nation-states 
as equals have dominated the world economic system. This 
m eans th a t the corresponding willingness and ability of the 
trading and borrowing/loaning partners, assum ed as perfectly 
suitable to the needs of the country in question undergoing the 
debt cycle, cannot be taken for granted.
However, the model is not only problematic in term s of its 
implicit political economy, but also highly doubtful w ith regard 
to its stra igh t economics, particularly to savings and invest­
ment. The classical economists used to conceive savings as 
some kind of fund which was supposed to be the prerequisite 
for investm ent, and it is this approach which still m akes Neo- 
classicists as well as some M arxists (e.g., Schubert 1985: 273) 
prone to the idea th a t domestic savings can and should be 
"supplemented" by external funds to close the "real resource 
gap," w hereas a surplus of savings over investm ent and ex­
ports over im ports would mean a "drain" abroad of real domes­
tic resources. Although th is concept is quite convincing to the 
non-economist and the planning model mechanic alike, because 
in the individual household, the idea of supplem enting one's 
own in ternal "savings" w ith external mortgages to finance a 
housing or any other "investment" is easily understood on the 
microeconomic level, the transfer of this model to the aggregate 
macroeconomic level tu rns out to be u tterly  misleading, once
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the implicit classical assum ption of full employment is relaxed. 
Ever since the "Keynesian Revolution" of the 1930s and 40s, 
aggregate macroeconomic savings are considered a residual, 
determ ined by the more or less autonomous decisions of the in­
dividual firms, households and governmental bodies w ith re­
gard to consumption, investm ent, fiscal incomes and expendi­
tures, exports and imports. Whenever an unused potential of 
idle real domestic resources, including labor, is pu t into play -  
and th a t is, after all, w hat development economics is all about 
-  investm ent and exports cannot be said to be realized a t the 
expense of consumption, bu t should be viewed as income-gener­
ating activities which in tu rn  make possible fu rther consump­
tion and accumulation.
Thus, as countries continue to borrow, i.e., during the debt- 
increasing phases, the model fallaciously insists th a t imports 
are the bottleneck of development. Given the century-old m er­
cantilist view and practical experience of development via ex­
port promotion, th is basic premise should have m et w ith great 
scepticism, but it did not, largely because of the quasi-engineer­
ing suggestion th a t modern investm ents in infrastructure as 
well as factories be viewed strictly in term s of the imported 
m achinery they often require; it was overlooked th a t "invest­
ment" in the economic sense comprises also all kinds of spend­
ing for buildings and other domestic goods which would gener­
ate a stream  of monetary income as well as nonm onetary utility 
in the future. Some imported machinery is certainly crucial for 
the im plem entation of nearly every major development project, 
but the bulk of macroeconomic "investment" is always executed 
w ith local resources. Investm ent and exports are the bottle­
necks of economic development, not savings and imports.
In addition, the proponents of the debt-cycle hypothesis h it 
further difficulties when trying to explain the transition  from 
debt-increasing to -decreasing phases. Siebert (1989) gives the 
following reasons why countries may be stuck a t "half cycle": 
borrowing for consumption, low productivity of capital, worsen­
ing term s of trade and a rise in the real in terest rate. Quoting
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Kindleberger, he mentions G uatem ala as a case for a "cycle of 
debt and default" (Siebert 1989: 225) instead of a "full debt cy­
cle." The blame for not completing the cycle is characteristically 
put on the behavior of the debtor, i.e., his "high time preference" 
or "great impatience," using foreign funds for consumption and/ 
or current budget deficits ra th e r than  for investment.
This argum ent can be criticized not only for its bias against 
the debtor which downplays external factors, bu t for mixing 
two different dimensions: In the first place, consumption and 
deficit financing of current public expenditure is always detri­
m ental to long-term accumulation (not necessarily to short-term  
stabilization of employment), regardless of the state  of external 
accounts; and on the other hand, changes in the stock of net 
debt are always a balance of gross foreign exchange receipts 
and expenditures in which individual loans only form a certain, 
mostly minor part. In macroeconomic term s, the use of the total 
of foreign exchange receipts of a certain period -  export pro­
ceeds, transfers, and loans -  has to be evaluated, since ju s t like 
in a budget, a certain income cannot be directly related to a 
specific expenditure. T hat m eans it is possible th a t despite an 
apparently  consumptive use of a certain foreign loan the rest of 
the foreign exchange income could be used for such highly pro­
ductive purposes th a t the country's economic capacity is greatly 
advanced tow ard becoming a net creditor in the long run. Sim­
ilarly, and more im portantly, the productive use of a particular 
loan does not necessarily mean the enhancem ent of the coun­
try 's economic development when it w astes its other foreign ex­
change resources and/or in ternal resources on consumption 
and imports. I t is always the total of all items on a balance 
sheet which counts, not an individual transaction or item. That 
is also why Fishlow's (1995) distinction between "revenue bor­
rowing" and "development borrowing" may not be as clearcut 
as it looks a t first sight, even though one has to adm it th a t the 
declared or obvious developmental misuse of a specific loan 
usually can be taken as a ra th e r reliable indicator for the gen­
eral m ism anagem ent of the economy.
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The debt-cycle model is not only convenient for the construc­
tion of planning models, for providing the developing countries 
w ith a justification for growth-cum-debt policies and for the 
case-by-case trea tm en t of Third World nations by creditors and 
their clubs and committees, bu t it also serves to paint a h a r­
monious picture of North-South economic interdependence: 
either the capital needs of the South require an export surplus 
from the N orth (e.g., Germany and Japan), or the switch from 
net debt growth to net repaym ent requires increased m arket 
access for the South, i.e., a deficit by N orthern countries (e.g., 
the U.S.A.). Thus it is overlooked th a t com plem entarity is 
ra th e r a North-North phenomenon at the South's expense: the 
U.S. deficit on current account (exports minus imports) is the 
outcome of large capital im ports due to high in terest rates, and 
German and Japanese surpluses are due to export promotion 
and undervaluation policies which -  in a finite world -  force 
their trad ing  partners into a situation of overvaluation of their 
currencies m aking exports more difficult. Seen from this angle, 
the "net resource transfer" abroad from Germany and Japan  
benefits the U.S.A., not the developing countries. Consequently, 
as already pointed out, the highly indebted middle-income 
countries of Latin America confront both high real in terest 
rates, stem m ing from U.S. policies, and structura l export diffi­
culties, except for cheap industrial raw m aterials, like iron ore, 
because of the G erm an and Japanese export bias. These formi­
dable handicaps can only be overcome by considerable debt re­
duction and export drives which successfully conquer world 
m arket shares from competitors and win m arket access from 
established in terests. As the recent GATT talks rem ind us, this 
is hardly to be expected for and from the bulk of the Latin A- 
m erican countries, except perhaps for a small country of s tra te ­
gic in terest such as Bolivia, -  and even here the export drive 
(for coca) cannot a t all be considered to be the outcome of com­
plem entary national interests.
The congruence of the debt-cycle model w ith the theory of 
"modernization" and Rostow's model of "Stages of Economic
58 M anfred N itsch
Growth" (Rostow 1960) -  from the "traditional society" and the 
emergence of the "preconditions for take-off to the "take-off' 
w ith its rise in the ra te  of net investm ent, the drive to "m aturi­
ty" and "selfsustained growth" and finally the "mass-consump- 
tion society" -  gives the sequence a certain optimistic and qua- 
si-determ inistic touch. Any obstacle on the path  of progress is 
easily reduced to a stum bling block, and crises tend to be viewed 
as accidents on th a t road ra th e r than  reshufflings of hegemonic 
hierarchies and definite defeats or victories as quoted in the 
preceding pages. W ith regard to the debt issue, th a t m eans an 
obvious bias tow ard considering the present Latin  American 
crisis a "liquidity" problem ra th e r than  one of "insolvency." The 
corresponding therapy includes stretching of m aturities, new 
money, adjustm ent, as well as growth and export policies in or­
der to "grow out of debt." Only in very special cases and under 
extraordinary circumstances is the need for substantial debt 
reduction for individual countries recognized. It should be noted 
ta h t Figure 1 represents an overly optimistic bias even in its 
graphics: the implicit annual in terest ra te  am ounts to only 
3.5 percent; once a realistic real in terest ra te  of, let us say, 
eight percent is assumed, the volume of the necessary trade ac­
count surplus in phase III becomes much more formidable.
On the whole, the orthodox view of debt and development con­
veys a ra th e r harmonious and optimistic picture of the status 
quo and the foreseeable future, and it stresses m anageability 
and m utual in terests over the antagonistic tra its  of the problem.
5. T h e S tr u c tu r a lis t  T r a d itio n  in  L a tin  A m erica
European textbooks about in ternational economics s ta r t off 
w ith the closed, autarchic national economy which, in the case 
of a two-countries, two-goods and two-factors model, opens up 
in order to enjoy the benefits of international trade: each coun­
try  tends to specialize in the good of its comparative advan­
tage, and both are better off once free trade has its way. This
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model, first formulated by David Ricardo (1817), reflects the 
experience of Europe where modern times, enlightenm ent, in ­
dustrial revolution, colonialism, im perialism  and increased 
mass consumption have marched in step w ith the opening up 
of relatively closed traditional agrarian  economies.
However, former colonial regions of the world view history 
differently: modern times begin w ith the traum atic experience 
of colonialism on the victims' side, and ever since "development" 
as well as "underdevelopment" is largely shaped by outside for­
ces, such as price movements, technological breakthroughs, 
new discoveries and world wars. No wonder th a t the W eltan­
schauung w ith regard to international economic relations 
tends to differ substantially  between eurocentric orthodoxy and 
the views from the South.
In Latin America, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA) -  la ter to be renam ed Economic Com­
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Span­
ish: Comisión Económica para América L atina (CEPAL) and 
respectively Comisión Económica para América L atina y el 
Caribe (CEPALC) -  took the intellectual and political lead in 
the post-World W ar II era under its first Executive Secretary 
Raul Prebisch (1962 [1949] I.1 Prebisch became famous because 
of his argum ent th a t the term s of trade for the raw -m aterial 
exporting countries suffered secular worsening. Even though 
his statistical basis did not prove to be completely reliable and 
the Korea Boom of the early 1950s seemed to belie his thesis 
shortly after its first publication in 1949, the subsequent slump 
in in ternational commodity prices gave it so much credence th a t 
cepalismo became the dom inant economic doctrine in the region. 
Its debate w ith orthodoxy over the causes of inflation and its 
cures centered around "monetarist" vs. "structuralist" ap­
proaches, the former stressing monetary factors and policies 
and the la tte r s tructu ra l reforms such as land and tax  reforms, 
im port-substituting industrialization, modernization of agri­
1 For a summary of "Latin American Economics" see Fishlow (1985b).
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culture, regional integration in Latin America and a new in­
ternational economic order. The center-periphery model in tro­
duced by Prebisch was la ter radicalized by the dependencia 
school (see S au tter 1986 and Nitsch 1986 for a survey and a de­
bate on its reception in Germany), before the Southern Cone 
swung tow ard the Right and m onetarist experiments, which 
did not solve Latin America's development problems either. 
Ever since the outbreak of the present debt crisis in 1982, "a 
pragm atic neo-structuralism  appears to be gaining influence 
throughout the region," as Fishlow (1985b: 142) puts it.2 Most 
recently, in view of the crumbling of the E astern  bloc, the pen­
dulum  may even be seen as having again moved toward ortho­
doxy, i.e., more em phasis on m arkets, external openness and 
m onetary considerations can be detected in virtually  all political 
and academic pronunciamientos w ith regard to economic policy, 
without, however, discarding (neo-)structuralism  altogether or 
openly propagating "Chicago Boys" economics, as the Southern 
Cone dictatorships had done in the 1970s.
Foreign exchange constraint has formed a basic tenet of the 
structu ra list as well as the orthodox paradigm, so th a t running 
into debt has generally been seen as an easing of th a t constraint 
ra th e r than  a lure into the debt trap. Even though the more rad ­
ical exponents of structuralism  have raised a great deal of criti­
cism against m ultinational corporations and their behavior in 
Latin America, the positive attitude of nearly all political and 
intellectual Latin American currents toward capital imports 
has made it easy for the N orthern orthodoxy to gain general ac­
ceptance of its message of complementary in terests between 
the export-surplus capital-exporting N orth and the im port-sur­
plus capital-importing "developing" South. Further, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) gave this arrangem ent an even 
greater appearance of m utuality  and altruism  for develop­
m ent's sake because of the "soft" term s of some of the loans. On 
account of the ir inclination toward cheap money, a certain le­
2 See also Bitar (1988); Ffrench-Davis (1988), Ground (1986); Rosales (1988); Taylor 
and Arida (1988), and Villarreal (1986).
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niency w ith regard to inflation, optimism with respect to the 
active role of the State in promoting development and an anti- 
oligarchic discourse, the structu ralists have had, and still have, 
a hard  time coming to grips w ith m onetary discipline, as well as 
with export promotion. Leaving these "hard" aspects and facts 
of economic life to the "monetarists," however, made the advo­
cates of heterodox approaches and the politicians who tried to 
put them  into practice vulnerable to the criticism th a t they 
either, in fact, applied orthodox stabilization policies or let eco­
nomic m anagem ent slip out of their hands, thus provoking capi­
ta l flight and hyper-inflation.
In the last few years the neo-structuralists have tried to gain 
advances in the monetary field, e.g., developing the theory of 
"inertial inflation" (Pereira and Nakano 1987), and various so- 
called "heterodox shocks" in Latin American countries were 
widely discussed, but B itar's diagnosis of the structu ra list ap­
proach being guilty of an "insufficient incorporation of the fi­
nancial variables" (Bitar 1988: 47) is basically still correct. In 
the following pages an effort will be made to examine the pos­
sible contribution of M onetary Keynesianism to close this gap 
and eventually provide the m issing link.
6. M on eta ry  K ey n es ia n ism  an d  Its A p p roach  to  th e  D eb t  
P ro b lem
In contrast to those who stress the "final demand" and the "fis­
cal policy" side of Keynes, M onetary Keynesians tend to em­
phasize the dominance of the financial over the real goods and 
factors sphere.3 On the micro level, the key agent and sover­
eign of the modern, i.e. monetarized, economy is the w ealth own­
er whose portfolio dispositions according to his or her liquidity
3 See Davidson (1983-84); Kregel (1980); Minsky (1977, 1980); Moore (1979), and the 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics for the discussion in English, and Riese (1986, 
1989) and his "Berlin School" with Hauptmann (1987); Herr (1989); Lüken-Klaßen and 
Betz (1989); Nitsch (1993); Riese and Spahn (1989); Stadermann (1986), and Tober 
(Ms. 1991) for the German debate.
62 M anfred N itsch
preference and risk  propensity determ ine w hether money is 
held or spent, loans are contracted, serviced and redeemed and 
equity instrum ents, such as shares, bu t also all other types of 
participation in equity, are underw ritten, bought, sold and ser­
viced w ith profit shares. Before entering into the discussion 
about the in ternational alternatives for the w ealth owner, we 
should note the typically Keynesian underem ploym ent equilib­
rium  concerning labor and other real resources: the productive 
enterprise will hire only as much labor as is compatible w ith the 
servicing of its  liabilities and equity; its financiers, not its cus­
tom ers nor its  workers have the final say, which m eans th a t 
there is always a cut-off point in the queue of job-seekers.
Figure 2: The Wealth Owner and the Hierarchy of 









Less Developed Country 
(in a Phase of Stagnation)
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In a world of many national currencies the w ealth owners (be 
it a net w ealth owner or an interm ediary such as a bank or an ­
other type of firm in any part of the world and of any am ount of 
wealth) can choose to invest in financial or real assets, and 
w ithin the category of financial assets (including equity in pro­
ductive enterprises), to hold liabilities (financial instrum ents 
including banknotes) of the hegemonic power (e.g. U.S.$), the 
secondary powers (e.g. DM, Yen, F r and £) or of the "developing 
country" or, finally, the "less developed country" (defined here 
in Figure 2 -  for didactic purposes -  as a country undergoing a 
phase of real income stagnation or decrease, w hereas a "devel­
oping country" is defined as a Third World country in a phase 
of growth).
Productive enterprises in the "developing country" can a ttrac t 
the financial m eans necessary for real investm ent, thus provid­
ing income for labor and fuelling the process of accumulation 
and economic growth, only if they can offer a re tu rn  on invest­
m ent which can compete favorably w ith the alternatives, shown 
in Figure 2.
It is a t this point th a t the peculiarities of Third World coun­
tries come into play: the huge in ternational income and tech­
nology disparities are m irrored w ithin those countries by w hat 
structu ralists have called "structural heterogeneity," i.e., the 
apparently peaceful "dualism" of old and new, rich and poor, 
traditional and modern segments of society. At closer inspec­
tion, however, this tu rn s out to be a conflict-ridden, precarious 
hierarchy of dominance and power between social groups and 
classes of various interlinked modes of production and repro­
duction. For a m onetarized economy this m eans high risk  pre­
mium, inflationary pressure, weak government w ith fiscal pro­
blems and foreign exchange control.
Coming back to the alternatives open to the w ealth owners, 
any contract made in the currency of the "developing country," 
let alone the "less developed country," runs the risk  of currency 
devaluation. Treasuries as well as commercial and savings 
banks have therefore introduced indexed bonds or other finan-
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cial instrum ents in a num ber of countries, thus attracting  
funds which m ight otherwise flee abroad, bu t a t the same time 
m aking the sources of finance for the domestic productive 
enterprises and for public services besides debt servicing more 
expensive so th a t they tend to be sustained by cheap credit and 
inflationary financing, respectively. Nevertheless, once the fis­
cal lim its are reached, the w ealth owners will w ithdraw  their 
funds and -  in spite of foreign exchange controls -  switch into 
convertible currencies. Finally, w ithin the "less developed 
country" only state  enterprises and poor family enterprises in 
the countryside and in the so-called "informal" urban  sector, 
both of which do not function according to the logic of a capital­
ist m onetary economy, rem ain intact. The former have to strug­
gle w ith all the ir well-known efficiency problems, and the la tter 
can only keep on going so long as they are really poor. Money 
as a medium of exchange is, of course, also present w ith the 
campesinos and the urban informales in Latin America, but 
w ith increasing w ealth the microeconomic integration in these 
household-enterprises of labor, land/dwelling and capital under 
the dominance of labor tends to break up when some members 
(typically men) s ta rt to behave as w ealth owners, i.e., investing 
surpluses in lucrative financial and real assets beyond the con­
trol of the family.
The "developing country" is thus particularly  prone to slip 
down the in ternational hierarchical scale into the sta tus of a 
"less developed country" when external debts have accum ula­
ted to such a degree th a t they are unserviceable, exposing the 
exchange ra te  to the risk  of even further deterioration and when 
indexed treasury  bonds and sim ilar instrum ents have led to a 
fiscal crisis which will bankrupt the State on its in ternal debt 
as well. At th a t point hyperinflation m ust be checked through 
m onetary reform and external debt rescheduling or relief, if a 
total collapse of the economy is to be avoided (Ms. Tober 1991). 
The C entral Bank and the Government of the "less developed 
country" will have to regain the confidence of in ternal as well 
as external w ealth owners in order to re tu rn  to the position of
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a "developing country." In this process the "state of confidence," 
a key term  in Keynes' General Theory (Keynes 1936: chap. 12), 
plays a significant role, because the w ealth owner's income 
from investm ent equals the sum of the non-pecuniary and the 
m onetary net income from the respective asset. Consequently, 
the m onetary re tu rn  on investm ent in a productive enterprise 
m ust be all the higher when, given the re tu rns and risks of in ­
ternational external investm ent opportunities, confidence in 
stable money and hence government and central bank policies, 
is dem onstrably lowered. On the other hand, nationalist appeals 
can create a certain am ount of non-pecuniary rew ards for do­
mestic w ealth owners, and sanctions can increase the m onetary 
as well as the non-pecuniary "transaction costs" of overcoming 
or eluding exchange controls.
Increased income for w ealth owners, of course, then  opens 
the questions of income distribution, structu ra l reforms and 
democracy. The "state of confidence" for investors is not neces­
sarily best guaranteed in a democratic regime, nor does a mili­
ta ry  dictatorship à la Pinochet or Marcos necessarily inspire 
"confidence." The post-1968 dependentista  topics of capitalism  
vs. democracy and underdevelopment as the fate of the periph­
ery in the world capitalist system (Frank 1968) thus re tu rn  to 
the fore when we confront the implications of the simple portfo­
lio model of Figure 2. After all, Lüken-Klaßen and Betz (1989: 
218) sta te  the purpose of their paper explicitly in dependencia 
terms: "We w ant to show...that the perspective of w orld-m arket 
related dependency can be analytically underpinned by the eco­
nomics of M onetary Keynesianism."
Before tu rn ing  to the question of how to make use of the ben­
efits while avoiding the unquestionable flaws of the depen­
dencia approach, let us look a t the upper parts of Figure 2: the 
w ealth owner can choose to invest in the financial instrum ents 
of the hegemon (if there is one) or of secondary economic pow­
ers. In a stable hegemonic system the key-currency country typi­
cally acts as the world's banker offering high non-pecuniary 
rew ards to its foreign depositors, which correspond to low mo­
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netary  in terest rates, while supplying the rest of the world 
w ith relatively cheap credit and investm ent. T hat was the a r­
rangem ent under the Gold S tandard which, to a great extent, 
was, in fact, a £-Standard (Ford 1962), as well as under the 
U .S.$-Standard in the Bretton-Woods System of the post-World 
W ar II era. The 1970s and 1980s, however, saw the advent of a 
multi-currency standard  (Herr 1989; S taderm ann 1986, and the 
above-quoted M arxist sources) w ith rivalling "strong," fully 
convertible currencies. While the U.S.A. as well as sm aller 
countries such as A ustralia, Italy, etc., by offering high in terest 
rates, were each in a position to a ttrac t foreign capital and not 
scare away local w ealth owners, Japan  and Germany were 
showing high and persistent export surpluses brought about by 
applying policies which have kept their currencies undervalued. 
Both strategies, however, run  counter to the aspirations and 
development necessities of the developing and the less devel­
oped countries, which are put in a situation which require v ir­
tually impossible "adjustment" and "debt-servicing" efforts.
As Riese (1989: 196) emphasizes:
The central thesis is th a t in view of the ir lim ited m onetary and 
productive potential the developing countries are unable to count­
er the  undervaluation strategies of leading industrial countries....
The conditions of the functioning of the world m arket make it  
thus impossible for the developing countries to carry the burden 
of the crisis -  which m eans th a t the strategy of devaluation of the 
developing countries' currencies as propagated by recent academic 
research, as well as the strategy of consolidation of the balance of 
paym ents as the ruling m onetary policy institu tions advocate, are 
bound to fail.
This diagnosis ra th e r bluntly confirms the famous characteri­
zation of economics as a "dismal science"; however, a great deal 
is gained by this sober reasoning, nam ely realism  w ith respect 
to policy prescriptions and evaluations and the well-placed in ­
tegration of monetary and financial variables into the non- or 
anti-orthodox analytical paradigm. In fact, even more so than  
during the 1960s when dependencia became the leading hetero­
dox slogan in Latin America, in the "lost decade" of the 1980s
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w ith its dragging debt crisis, it has become empirically evident 
th a t the asym m etries between Center and Periphery persist or 
grow and th a t the ta lk  about "Newly Industrializing Countries" 
and "The Differentiation of the Periphery" (e.g., H urtienne 1989; 
M ármora and M essner 1989) should not be m isread as a gener­
al re tu rn  to modernization theory and orthodox harmonism.
Academics and politicians alike have been paying increasing 
attention to pyram id climbing w ithin the in ternational h ie ra r­
chy, not so much by the rich OPEC countries w ith their oil rev­
enues, but focussing their analysis on South Korea and the 
other E ast Asian NICs. Although we cannot sum m arize here 
the resu lts of all the very varied studies devoted to the NICs, 
we can refer to the explicitly M onetary Keynesian paper by Al­
fred H annig (1989; see also H auptm ann 1987: 57-61, and Riese 
1986) which should help to understand the policy implications 
of th a t approach.
H annig (1989: 277-278) notes "three central contradictions" 
between the adjustm ent policies of South Korea and neoclassi­
cal theory:
(1) There was m arked, development-oriented protectionism -  in­
compatible w ith liberal m arket theories.
(2) The undervaluation of its currency, implemented by South 
Korea after 1980 signifies a price distortion....
(3) Sim ilar to Japan , South Korea has consciously concentrated 
on technology- and capital-intensive products w ith a high income 
elasticity of demand, i.e., goods which, under the aspect of com­
parative advantage, seemingly do not m ake sense, but in the long 
run  strengthen South Korea's position on the world m arkets and 
satisfy increasing in ternal dem and in the course of a rising pro­
pensity to consume.
The macroeconomic criteria for assessing an economic policy 
strategy or a constellation of m arket forces include not only 
these three -  development- (i.e., investm ent- and export-) ori­
ented ones, i.e., protectionism, currency undervaluation, and 
high-technology exports -  bu t also the development of the in ­
ternal m arket via progressive income and tax policies as well 
as w ealth redistribution, the control of inflationary processes
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under strong political leadership, including adm inistrative 
m easures, and the establishm ent of a functioning financial sys­
tem -  even if South Korea can hardly be seen as a model case 
for liberalization and "get-your-prices-right" policies in the fi­
nancial sector, as some neoliberals would like to present it.
While the world m arkets and the in ternational constellation 
of forces do not perm it an advance on a broad front, an individ­
ual country, especially a small one, can still get through the eye 
of the needle. In  the closing words of Lüken-Klaßen and Betz 
(1989: 263):
Of course, it can happen th a t the dishw asher becomes a million­
aire. But he does so w ithin the framework of a m arket system 
which again and again enforces th a t there continue to be enough 
dishwashers....Sim ilarly, individual countries can, of course, es­
cape from the sta te  of dependency, but not all countries can be 
dragons.
They echo the im portant contribution of W allerstein (1976; 
also Hopkins and W allerstein 1977) to the Center-Periphery 
model of the modern world system: not only for economic, but 
also for political reasons a strictly dichotomic structu re would 
not be viable, since it would obviously condemn the majority to 
a perm anent sta te  of inferiority, and in the presence of exclu­
sively polarizing processes the "Center" could be sure to enjoy a 
perm anent sta te  of bliss. T hat is evidently not the case, so th a t 
a th ird  category, called "Semiperiphery" by W allerstein, is es­
sential for the stability of the system. Indeed, Figure 2 includes 
even four categories of countries, since for m onetary affairs es­
pecially, there is a m arked difference between a hegemonic and 
a m ulti-currency standard  within the group of the "Center," 
while the thresholds between a "developing country" and a "less 
developed country" on the one hand, and a competing bu t "sec­
ondary power" w ith a convertible currency on the other, are still 
large enough to w arran t each an additional distinction, w ithout 
being so large as to exclude a change of status. Such "ex-devel- 
oping countries" of Europe as Spain, Greece and Portugal have 
already undergone it, while Turkey, Cyprus and the other 
Southeast and Central European nations are eager to make
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the transition. On the contrary, nearly all the Latin American 
countries have only experienced the ups and downs between 
the "developing" and the "less developed country" categories.
For the individual country and its policy-makers (and intellec­
tuals) the system  thus leaves a certain degree of hope and room 
for m aneuvering which tends to reinforce its stability  and to 
lend credibility to single-nation paradigm s such as the debt- 
cycle model, -  even though for the rest of the world the fantasy 
of the dishw asher tu rned  millionaire is probably still considered 
to be much less likely than  in one's own country. Seen from the 
outside, the hierarchical model as such is less in teresting than  
the form of the pyramid, its detailed structure, its career p a t­
terns, dominance mechanisms, opportunities of em ancipation 
and cooperation as well as its stability and its inheren t germs 
of w ar and chaos.
To sum up the review of macroeconomic approaches to the 
debt issue, a high degree of com plementarity can be found be­
tween the structu ra list and the M onetary Keynesian schools, 
both of which confront orthodoxy based on neoclassical growth- 
cum-debt models but, a t the same time, accept the global capi­
ta list world economy w ith its benefits and fallacies as it is 
ra th e r than  m easure it w ith the yardstick of "socialist forms of 
social life" and the "project of a new society" (H inkelam m ert 
1988: 80-81) or a fundam entally "new" in ternational economic 
order, as M arxists tend to do. This m eans th a t an am algam a­
tion of structuralism  and M onetary Keynesianism could pro­
vide a ra th e r comprehensive heterodox answ er in analytical 
term s as well as w ith regard to economic policy, even if  such a 
project is not only a perm anent and probably never-ending 
task, but would have to include many essential non-economic 
aspects such as democratic participation, ecological su sta in ­
ability, and social justice. For strictly economic diagnosis and 
therapy, a t present it is probably not easy to find a better set of 
analytical macroeconomic tools.4
4 Luiz G. Beluzzo provides in "Os keynesianos monetários," (Isto é, Senhor, São Paulo, 
July 17, 1991), p. 21, a competent Brazilian response to the "Berlin School" argu­
ments, as exposed in this article.
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7. I n s t itu t io n a l M icro eco n o m ics  an d  D eb t C r is is  
M an a g em en t
The m ain th ru s t of the recent economic literatu re about the L at­
in American debt crisis is, in fact, microeconomic in nature. 
Even famous authors of macroeconomic textbooks such as F i­
scher (1987) and Dornbusch (1989; Cardoso and Dornbusch 
1989; Dornbusch et al. 1989) concentrate mostly on "burden- 
sharing" and institu tional set-ups and reforms when w riting on 
debt m atters. Dornbusch's article on "overvaluation" (1988) 
quite interestingly reveals the uneasiness and undecidedness 
of th is broad-minded economist w ith Latin leanings (but not to 
be counted as one of the M onetary Keynesians) when it comes 
to assessing an exchange ra te  policy on macroeconomic criteria 
between over- and undervaluation. He and E liana Cardoso are 
obviously on much firm er ground when they present their 
"debt proposal" (Cardoso and Dornbusch 1989: 133) which re­
conciles the im mediate in terests of debtors and creditors in or­
der to overcome the present crisis w ithout trying to solve the 
differences in long-term macroeconomic thought.
Their pragm atic solution includes most parts of the "menu" 
offered and dealt w ith in recent debt negotiations: setting  aside 
a certain am ount of foreign exchange for servicing priority 
debts and for buying up, in the form of auctions, claims whose 
owners accept the highest discount; establishing a counterpart 
fund in local currency to be used for financing much-needed pub­
lic investm ent and for debt-equity or debt-loan swaps. They 
complete the list by adding the international "Debt G uarantee 
and Refinancing T rust Fund" to be affiliated to the World Bank, 
as suggested by the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on In ­
ternational Debt (Dornbusch 1989) and -  in this and/or other 
forms -  by other groups and individuals as well. And finally we 
should m ention the debt-nature or -ecology link which tries to 
connect the protection of the environment, particularly  tropical 
forests, w ith the reduction of debt (Oberndorfer 1989a, 1989b;
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Speth 1987). It would certainly go too far to discuss the whole 
gam ut of debt crisis m anagem ent proposals, but some sugges­
tions m erit special attention in order to show the essentials of 
the microeconomic theory underpinning many of them.
The idea of buying up one's debts through regular auctions 
was elaborated on by Mike Faber in his Dudley Seers Memo­
rial Lecture a t the Free University of Berlin on the Sunday be­
fore the 1988 IMF/World Bank Annual Assembly in Berlin 
(Faber 1988). There he coined the phrase "theory of the second 
worst," which conveys a quite significant understanding of the 
pragm atic politics of debt negotiations, when the participating 
actors begin to move toward an official or silent agreem ent be­
cause all of them  consider the alternatives worse than  the pro­
posed solution, even though nobody likes the outcome. It is 
even more significant for understanding the methodological 
approach of the new institu tional economics, the m athem atical 
expression of which is no longer the infinitesim al calculus for 
arriving a t "optimum," i.e., first-best, or "second-best" solutions, 
but game theory, where two or more players try  to win and/or 
avoid losses by following certain strategies whereby the result 
for each player depends on the behavior of the others, and where 
outright losses are often a t stake.
The "rules of the game" (Dam 1982) evolve and change over 
time in such a way th a t repeated interactions lead to predict­
able behavior. The key concept is the "institution," defined as 
"a set of constraints which governs the behavioral relations 
among individuals or groups" (Nabli and N ugent 1989: 1335). 
Institution-building is thus particularly im portant when con­
stra in ts  lead to a situation in which all of the players in the 
game are better off than  in a situation where each behaves 
freely w ithout the constraint in question. The establishm ent of 
a traffic light is an easily understandable example for success­
ful institution-building.
Another pertinent example relates to juridical norms and in­
stitutions, i.e., in the case of debt to bankruptcy laws and other 
rules related to illiquidity and insolvency of private persons as
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well as business firms, municipalities, etc. The transfer of 
these institu tional arrangem ents to the in ternational sphere 
has been advocated and discussed ra th e r widely,5 but in spite 
of the generally accepted conviction th a t unpayable debts w ar­
ran t a specialized legal procedure in every sta te  and every le­
gal system, very little progress has been made on the in terna­
tional level -  a t least as far as formal agreem ents are concerned. 
W ith regard to de facto arrangem ents, the Brady P lan (Brady 
1989; Kampffmeyer 1989, Devlin and Lustig 1990) has finally 
recognized the need for debt relief, and recent debt negotia­
tions have moved toward bankruptcy-type deals, linking in te r­
nal and external reductions of the overall public debt overhang 
in more or less comprehensive "monetary reforms," as required 
for reestablishing a functioning m onetary economy (Tober Ms. 
1991). The microeconomics of debt reduction is thus directly 
connected w ith the macroeconomics of a m onetary economy. 
However, there is still a long way to go until fair and equal 
trea tm en t (of both debtors and creditors), systems of binding 
sanctions and all the other details which go w ith an orderly 
bankruptcy or composition procedure are a t last firmly estab­
lished. This is true  not only for the in ternational level, bu t also 
for the bankruptcy of central governments when loss-sharing is 
on the agenda, and the unw ritten debts of the social security 
systems and other "invisible" obligations of the sta te  are easier 
to curtail th an  bonds and savings accounts which are often even 
formally indexed. For too many powerful players in the game it 
still seems worse to have constraints than  to be free to act; only 
when one player after the other learns th a t the freedom of the 
rest worsens his situation more than  do generally accepted 
constraints, can the "theory of the second worst" be applied as 
the practical basis for viable institution-building.
To sum m arize, microeconomic institu tional analysis can be 
applied to reconcile the im m ediate in terests of the various ac­
tors involved, regardless of their differing long-term objectives
5 See, e.g., Bacha (1982) and Fishlow (1982); Frank (1987); Kampffmeyer (1987); Mala- 
gardis (1990); Malagardis and Nitsch (1988); Nitsch (1987, 1989b), and Raffer (1990).
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and macroeconomic approaches. How to deal w ith an overbur­
dened debtor in a civilized way presents problems for orthodox 
and heterodox actors and intellectuals alike, and perhaps it is 
here, on the micro level, th a t economic theory can provide the 
most promising tools for policy-makers to contribute to the 
easing of the acute difficulties of developing countries. Equally, 
historians m ight be well advised to see if the tools of in s titu ­
tional microeconomics and game theory can also be useful for 
analyzing the m anagem ent and/or m ism anagem ent of past fi­
nancial crashes and debt crises.
A final cautionary note should be added on the distinction 
between micro- and macroeconomics, since the borderline is 
not as clear as has perhaps suggested in the preceding pages. 
Every macro-economic approach struggles w ith its "microfoun­
dations" and its institu tional implications and varieties, and, 
on the other hand, the "new" institu tional microeconomic ap­
proach does not content itself with the analysis of individual 
actors playing games, but, under the label of "New Political 
Economy," it seriously, and to a certain degree successfully, as­
pires to macro dimensions. T hat is why interm ediate ("meso") 
term s such as "(de)regulation" and "regime" and the correspond­
ing theoretical edifices have become fashionable, including in 
Latin America, and they have provided new and interesting 
stim uli across theoretical boundaries, from M arxism to Ortho­
doxy (e.g., V ath 1989). Those debates, however, have very rarely 
touched explicitly on the debt issue which is why they have 
been left out of this presentation.
